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iv

ARGUMENTS
I.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
In its statement of facts, plaintiff has made several factual errors in its

representations to this Court which are addressed below:
A. Melvin was employed as an account executive for Franklin Covey Co.
(hereinafter FCC and its predecessor companies) from 1992 to 1997.1 It is
undisputed between the parties that Melvin was employed by FCC from
1992 to 1995 in his home country, the United Kingdom, where he excelled
at his job and that the issues arising in this case relate solely to his later
employment from 1995 to 1997 in the U.S. by FCC. (See Attachment B,
Appellant's Brief, Declaration of David Melvin, page 1.)
B. Melvin's Maryland claim was one for unjust enrichment not
quantum meruit. (See Appellee's Addendum, tab 2, Exhibit B.) The
complaint actually alleges a claim for unjust enrichment.2

1

It is interesting plaintiff overlooks this fact since he later uses trips taken during this
earlier period to buttress his extremely weak claim regarding both Melvin's ties to
Utah and their nexus to business he conducted in Utah.
2
The complaint states:
"[8.] Franklin terminated Melvin from his employment with the company as of
September 12,1997. Franklin did not pay Melvin any severance or other
compensation in connection with his termination. After Franklin terminated
Melvin's employment Franklin paid Melvin commissions for all sales of services and
products that were delivered before September 12,1997
[9]
Franklin failed to pay Melvin commissions that he earned on sales contracts
entered into prior to the termination of his employment, but for which Franklin has
not yet delivered the service or product (at the time of his termination.)

1

Count I of the draft complaint specifically alleges that "it would be inequitable
for Franklin to retain the benefits of Melvin's efforts without compensating him, that
it breached its implied contact and was unjustly enriched. The count clearly states that it
is an action for unjust enrichment and requests that equity be done. Melvin's
compensation letter (Appellee's Addendum 4B) only states that he will be paid
commission on "anything you sell."
C. Plaintiffs claim that Melvin did not preserve the mechanical
adoption issue is patently false. As has been its consistent practice,

[10.] The sale of Franklin's products and services generally requires the salesman to
contact a potential customer, spend hours learning about the customer's business,
develop an understanding of the customer's training needs, and educate the customer
about how Franklin's services and products would meet the customer's needs.
[11] It is the nature of Franklin's business that sales contracts are rarely signed
when a sales person first contacts a prospective customer. Sales are based on a
relationship between the customer and Franklin that the sales person develops.
Competitors of Franklin have products and services that fill the same needs as
Franklin's products and services, so the relationship that the sales person develops is
a critical factor in a sale. The relationship may also help Franklin sell other products
(for which the sales person does not receive a commission). The sales contracts are
often signed months or even years after the sales person does the work in developing
the relationship.
[12.] Melvin spent a large percentage of his time meeting with prospective
customers and educating them about Franklin's services and products. He received
no compensation for these efforts on Franklin's behalf. (Nor were these duties set
forth in the document plaintiff refers to as the Compensation Agreement.)
[13.] At least eight customers (itemized in the draft complaint placed orders with
Franklin, through Melvin, before September 12,1997, but did not receive the services
or products before September 12,1997. Franklin failed to pay a commission to
Melvin for these sales.
[14.] At least one customer placed one or more order with Franklin after September
12,1997 as a direct result of Melvin's sales efforts. Franklin has not Melvin a
commission on there sales."

2

plaintiff sets forth only half sentences or those half of the facts that it
believes support its position and conveniendy ignores the rest. This issue
was raised before the trial court in Melvin's Reply Memorandum (See
Attachment A to this brief, page 3.)
II.

PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT MELVIN IS
SUBJECT TO T H E PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF T H E UTAH
COURTS.
The most important issue in this case is the lack of personal jurisdiction.

Even plaintiff, grudgingly, has admitted that the standard of review on this issue is
correction of error or the de novo review and, lacking jurisdiction, the case fails.
Plaintiff, understandably buries this issue at the back of his brief because he has
simply failed to show that the record supports the trial court's finding
Plaintiffs most notable argument, that he advances innumerable times
because he has no other facts to support this claim is that Melvin made ten trips to
Utah (over a period of 5.9 years.) The defendant asks this Court to examine these
trips carefully. Five occurred before plaintiff acknowledges that Melvin was
employed by FCC and while Melvin was still a resident of the U.K. They are all
distant in time and purpose, all were for training and conferences; all were undertaken
at FCCs instigation; and all but one were of extremely short duration. Even if this
Court gives credence to the plaintiffs argument that the trips themselves somehow
are evidence of defendant's transacting business within the state, the defendant
contends that there must be a logical nexus between the timing of the trips and the

3

dispute before this Court. Of the remaining 5 trips — all were short and undertaken
at FCC's instigation; 4 were for training or conferences (at which no sales activity of
any kind or nature has been alleged by either side), in fact Melvin was a relatively
passive participant The remaining trip, one day» also made at FCCs request for a
client meeting with GEC. It is from this one meeting on the GEC account in which
plaintiff finds a nexus to Utah because Melvin, in his Maryland complaint, alleged he
procured a major new customer for FCC. However, the customer, GEC, is not a
Utah corporation nor does it have any ties to Utah. The meeting took place in Utah
because FCC wanted it in Utah. Melvin was asked to attend because GEC was UK
based and Melvin, a UK citizen, had had a business relationship with GEC when he
worked in the UK. No sales were consummated at that time and all further contacts
and development took place in Maryland and New Jersey. In Roskelly & Co. v. Lerco,
610 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1980) the Court found that no personal jurisdiction existed on
facts that were stronger than those in the instant case. (In Koskelley, plaintiff
contacted defendant, a Kentucky corporation, for assistance in the repair of a
machine manufactured by the defendant, sold to a non Utah resident who eventually
sold it to the plaintiff, a Utah resident. Employees of the defendant went to Utah to
supervise the installation and adjustment of the equipment in plaintiffs Utah plant.
The Court found that the entry into Utah by the defendant's employees was solely for
supervising the installation of the equipment and that, alone, did not constitute
purposeful contacts with Utah that would support a finding of jurisdiction.)
Presumably the defendant in Koskelley received compensation for its services while in

4

Utah which Mr. Melvin has not. Melvin has never received any compensation for
either the trip, his time or from the proceeds of the contract. The facts in the instant
case are weaker than those before the Roskelly court and clearly do not support a
finding of special personal jurisdiction against the defendant.
In Burger King v. Rud^euirica, All U.S. 462,472 (1985) the court stated that the
fair warning requirement was met "if the defendant purposefully directed his
activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged
injuries that 'arise out of or related to5 these activities." The court noted that it is
not sufficient to meet the fair warning requirement where the plaintiff unilaterally
reaches beyond the forum. In the present case Melvin did not direct his activities
toward residents of Utah. He directed his activities, as set forth in his initial contract
with FCC and continued in the subsequent letter of agreement, to the Eastern
Region. The only reason for his presence in Utah was that the plaintiff required him
to attend meetings in Utah. His only business meeting was at plaintiffs behest with a
non Utah corporation. The Burger King court, quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958) stated, "the defendant, by its own acts must purposefully avail itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws." The facts alleged by the plaintiff are legally insufficient.
Further it should be noted that all of the facts plaintiff alleges to support its
allegations are derived from affidavits of the defendant. Plaintiff is a Utah
corporation based in Utah where the majority of its employees live and work. All of
its top personnel are in Utah and therefore, presumably available to plaintiff to

5

provide documentation as to defendant's alleged business activities in Utah.
However, despite this wealth of resources plaintiff fails to provide this Court with
anything to support its claim. In RoskeHey at page 1310, the court noted "[W]here
jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff cannot solely rely on allegations of jurisdiction in
the face of an affidavit by defendant which specifically contradicts those general
allegations.". In Newqys, Inc. v. Mc Causland, 950 P.2d 420 (Utah 1993) quoting
Anderson v. American Society ofPlastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 825 (Utah 1990) the Utah
Supreme Court stated that plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of
the evidence after making a prima facie showing before trial." Melvin notes that
plaintiff has intentionally declined to support its allegations with any declaration or
affidavit and has failed to meet its burden.
Where the Utah Courts have found that limited contacts by a defendant with
the forum state convey personal jurisdiction invariably there has been some real or
incipient harm to a Utah resident, unlike the instant case. Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co.,
Inc. 815 P.2d 246 (Utah App. 1991) (the parties agreement, while made out of state,
was made with the understanding that the disputed services would be performed in Utah.
Over eighteen years, defendants availed themselves of the services of a Utah resident
and suit arose over dispute regarding payment to the Utah resident for those services.)
Newajs, supra (out of state defendant initiated contact with Utah resident to solicit
business orders from Utah residents, defendant's actions injured Utah resident.) See also
Burt Drilling? Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980) (defendant initiated contact, to
supply goods to a Utah resident reasonably knowing goods would be used in the state.)

6

On facts alleging stronger ties to the forum state than those alleged by
plaintiff, the Utah courts have found a lack of specific personal jurisdiction. See
Roskelley, supra; Bradford v. Nagle 763 R2d 791 (Utah 19SS); Arguello v. Industrial
Woodworking Marchine Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992)
"Generally, the more closely related the contacts are to the cause of action for
which jurisdiction is taken, the fewer contacts are necessary to establish jurisdiction."
Rocky Mountain Claim Staking v. William, 884 P.2d 1301-2 (Utah App. 1994), conversely
where the nexus between the contact and the cause of action is non existent, one
allegation that defendant once, at his employer's insistence, provided support on a
sale in Utah to a non Utah corporation for one day is hardly sufficient to support
plaintiffs allegation of in personam jurisdiction.
III.

T H E ISSUE OF MECHANICAL ADOPTION WAS RAISED
BEFORE T H E TRIAL COURT A N D T H E TRIAL COURT HAD A N
OPPORTUNITY TO RULE O N IT.
Plaintiff quotes defendant's brief out of context. The sentence quoted in

plaintiffs brief relates to the fact that this issue wasn't raised until the filing of the
post trial motions because it wasn't relevant until after the trial court's initial rulings.
(See Attachment A, page 3). Therefore, the issue was properly raised before the trial
court and the trial court had an opportunity to rule on it which it failed to do.
Defendant has raised no other argument, as it cannot, to support its
contention that the trial court did not mechanically adopt findings of fact and
conclusions of law prepared for it and presented to it by counsel for the
plaintiff. Clearly plaintiffs counsel having presumably searched the record of the

7

case admits defeat, that there is nothing in the record that indicates the indicia
normally accepted by the Appellate Courts in Utah that the trial court adequately
deliberated or considered the merits of the case. State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012 (Utah
App. 1993); Alta Industries, Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993); Automatic
Control Products, Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc. 780 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1989); The Bayer Company v.
UgneU, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977).
IV.

T H E TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION, BECAUSE T H E PLAINTIFF WAS N O T T H E
PROPER PARTY, NOR AS A N ASSIGNEE DID PLAINTIFF
FULFILL ITS NOTICE OBLIGATION TO T H E D E F E N D A N T .
Plaintiffs contention that there was only one employment relationship is

unsupported by the facts unless the employment relationship being alleged is
between the defendant and FCC. 3 In response to Melvin's argument that in order
for plaintiff to be considered an assignee under Utah law per Lynch v. MacDonald, 367
P.2d 474 (Utah 1962) and to then sue the defendant based upon that assignment, it
must provide notice to the defendant of the assignment, it has provided one item, a
W-2 sent to Melvin months after he was terminated. It has conceded the fact, based
upon Delta Traffic Serfices, Inc. v. Sysco Intermountain Food Serices, 944 F.2d 911, (10th Cir.
1991), that "the burden of proving an assignment is upon him who claims
thereunder." Accord Alpine Associates, Inc. v. KP&R, 802 P.2d 1119,1121 (Colo. App.

3

In is interesting to note that he also argued that there was only one employer to the trial
court also, but he appears to have dropped this argument to this Court, perhaps
because plaintiff has convincingly demonstrated to this Court that wholly owned
subsidiaries and parent companies are considered separate legal entities under the law.
8

1990). By its own admission, the "Consent to be Bound 4 " "was not an actual
assignment but merely "notice to the court of the assignment/' and therefore, not
proof on which the trial court could base its decision regarding the relationship
between the parties.
In response to Melvin's argument that he was not provided with adequate
notice of the assignment, plaintiff repeatedly dredges up the one W-2 provided to
Melvin in January, 1998 for the tax year, 1997 upon which the name Franklin Covey
Client Sales (hereinafter FCCS) appears. Until alerted by plaintiffs counsel that this
item existed, Melvin had been completely unaware that Franklin Covey Client Sales'
name was on this document or any other. In fact Melvin had never heard of FCCS
until he was sued by FCCS in Utah. This document should be contrasted with the
following documents provided to or on behalf of Mr. Melvin by his employer FCC,
noting FCC (or a predecessor company) as Mr. Melvin's employer:
a.

All letters of appointment/agreement (at least 3) signed by FCC and
Melvin.

b.

All applications to the INS submitted on Melvin's behalf.

c.

All pay stubs that Melvin received during his employment.

d.

Business cards provided to Melvin by FCC identifying FCC as his
employer.

4

In its brief plaintiff contends that there is "absolutely no dispute between the parties
to the assignment as to its validity. This is irrelevant since FCC, according to the
plaintiff is not a party to this matter and therefore, its belief about the assignment is
immaterial. Defendant has consistendy disputed the validity of the assignment which
was also addressed before the trial court, in his initial brief and also herein.
9

e.

Letterhead provided to Melvin by FCC with FCC prominendy
featured, (not FCCS) for use for Melvin's correspondence on all FCC
related matters.

f.

Sales reports and forecasts routinely generated by FCC to its employees
that identify Melvin as a member of the team for the Eastern Region of
FCC.

Plaintiff offers the W-2 in the face of this overwhelming evidence, and argues
that this Court accept it as sufficient notice of the assignment to the defendant as
required by the Utah Courts, but it is not. In 4447 Associates v. First Security Financial,
889 P.2d 467,470 (Utah App. 1995) the court notes: [BJecause 4447 Associates
would benefit from a favorable determination of its rights as an assignee seeking to
enforce an assignment,// bore the burden of proving First Security received notice of the
assignment." In 4447 the court found that the mailing of the assignment documents (not
a mere filing informing the court of their existence several months after the issue
came before the trial court) with no proof that such documents were received by the
defendant was insufficient. In accord. People's Finance <& Thrift Co. v. Landes, 503 P.2d 444
(Utah 1992). In Bank of Salt Lake v. Corp. ofPresident of Church ofLater Day Saints, 534
P.2d 887 (1975), the assignee did send notices of the assignment with copies of the
assignment documents. While the court seems to accept the actions as adequate
attempts at notice, it still found the notice inadequate because it was served on an
employee who had no authority to accept such notice. In any event no such action
was undertaken by the plaintiff herein.

10

What is notable in all these cases is that an actual notice was served (or
attempted to be served before the commencement of any lawsuit), the notice document
contained the actual assignment documents as well as notice of the assignment, and they
were served within a reasonable period of time after the documents were executed.
Here, plaintiff, by his own admission, merely noticed the court and the defendant that
an assignment had been made, (after his status to prosecute this suit had been called
into question by the defendant), the actual assignment was not provided (either to the
court or the defendant) prior to the court's ruling on the summary or declaratory
judgments, nor is it clear from the actual document when it was signed. Since it is
undated, when the actual assignment occurred is unknown.5. In any event, Judge
Young never addressed the issue of the adequacy of the notice, nor did he make
findings related to these issues. Moreover, the effect of the so called "Consent to be
Bound" definitely prejudiced the defendant's rights and under the stand of review set

5

Plaintiff notes in his brief that the "Consent to be Bound" was signed by FCCS's
counsel Defendant challenged plaintiffs counsel's right to sign the document since
there was no evidence before the Utah Court, that plaintiffs counsel also represented
FCC. In defense plaintiff claims that Melvin "knew" that plaintiffs counsel
represented FCC because he filed an appearance on behalf of FCC m a case m federal
district court in Maryland. He presents no other argument to support his contention
for the correctness of his behavior. Yet it should be noted that a case has been filed
in Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland m which Melvin is the plaintiff
and FCC the defendant. This case has been ongoing for some time. Plaintiff s
counsel has filed no appearance and, to Melvin's knowledge, and from a review of the
public record, there is no indication that plaintiffs counsel represents FCC.
Plaintiffs argument is disingenuous at best and wrong at worst. One appearance in
federal district court m Maryland hardly provides the land of notice that, for instance,
a notice of appearance filed in District Court in Utah would provide. Melvin is
absolutely justified in questioning whether plaintiffs counsel had the capacity or
authorization to file the questionable "Consent to be Bound," and so should have
before the trial court.
11

forth in 4447 Associates, this Court should declare the action a nuUity. If a nuUity then
FCCS no longer retains its status as a real party at interest and the suit must be
dismissed.
(Plaintiffs arguments regarding the aUeged benefits and additional protections
offered to the defendant by the executive of this document are disingenuous and self
serving at best and have already been addressed in Melvin's brief and wiU not be
repeated here.)
V.

T H E TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT DISCRETION I N FAILING TO
MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT A N D T H E N I N
FINDING THAT T H E FACTS PRESENTS I N T H E RECORD
SUPPORTED ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER.
Plaintiffs counsel incorrecdy aUeges to this Court that it presented "two

unambiguous and undisputed agreements" to the trial court. While they were
undisputed and unambiguous by plaintiffs counsel, they were neither to the
defendant who argued these facts vociferously to the trial court.
As noted above, plaintiffs counsel, misinterpreting defendant's draft Maryland
complaint interpreted this case as one for quantum meruit. Rather, as set forth
above, the complaint clearly requested relief for unjust enrichment or restitution and
the facts fit such a claim. See Davies v. Olson 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987), quoting
Corbin on Contacts § 19 at 44,46. Also Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984),
"[TJhe measure of recovery is the law of the benefit conferred on the defendant (the
defendant's gain) and not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff, see First Inv. Co. v.
Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980), or necessarily the reasonable value of the
plaintiffs services." "Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains
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money or benefits which injustice and equity belong to another." American Towers
Owners Association, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996) citing
Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773-776 (Utah 1977). The
facts set forth in the Maryland complaint clearly support the test for unjust
enrichment set forth by the Utah Courts in the cases cited above.
The remaining question was whether defendant was barred based on the
April, 1997 letter of agreement. Through misquotation and artful use of
nomenclature FCCS attempts to mislead this Court and argues that there were no
material facts in dispute. FCCS first undisputed material fact was that FCCS was
defendant's employer from 1995 to 1997. First, as all of the documentary evidence,
including letters of agreement, etc. show, FCC was defendant's employer not FCCS.
and FCC employed the defendant from 1992 to 1997. Thus the plaintiffs first
material fact is demonstrably untrue.
Plaintiffs second alleged undisputed material fact involves a statement in the
"Compensation Agreement," a letter dated April 9,1997. (See Plaintiffs Addendum
4B.) That letter does not mention FCCS anywhere, rather the letterhead refers to
Franklin Quest Consulting Group, Formerly Shipley Associates, (which was later
identified in plaintiffs filing to the Maryland federal Court as a wholly owned
subsidiary of FCC. Accordingly, the plaintiff has admitted that it is not the entity that
entered into the April 9,1997 agreement.
It's third material fact relates to the Release signed by the defendant,
(Plaintiffs 4C), again FCCS is not mentioned anywhere. Finally the defendant notes

13

that neither the plaintiffs allegation to this Court nor his addendum (as well as these
same allegations to the trial court) are not supported by any affidavits, sworn
testimony, or other form of admissible evidence. Plaintiffs one paltry offering, the
W-2, was sent to defendant at least four months after his termination.
Plaintiffs sole legal argument in support of its claim that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that the facts presented to it supported its summary
judgment Order, is that the defendant is not entided to relief for a claim of quantum
meruitbecause there is an express agreement governing his compensation with FCC.
FCCS's counsel's argument is totally misplaced.
First, there is no express agreement between FCCS and the defendant (nor
sufficient notice of an assignment as discussed above.)
Second, even if the language in FCCs letter of agreement with the defendant
applied, it does not preclude additional compensation. This letter adopts by reference
a prior "Employment Agreement" which is not part of the record. Without this
additional document, the plaintiffs submission was incomplete. The section of the
letter addressing compensation stated that the defendant will be paid on a
commission basis. The letter goes on to state FCCs policy that commissions are only
paid on services delivered while the defendant is employed by FCC. This description
of an unwritten policy does not state a definitive rule. Further, FCC engaged
defendant

to sell products

the

as well as services. There is no provision in this letter

for payment and timing of payment for products sold. It is plaintiffs contention that
this brief description of policy is a complete description of the contract terms

14

between FCC and the defendant on the issue of the timing of sales and commissions
earned. This is not the case, at a minimum in the case of products sold. The
language quoted by plaintiff was insufficient to support its motion for summary
judgment or the trial court's' findings thereafter
Third, the agreement presumes

that the employment

relationship

would

not be terminated by FCC in bad faith The quoted provision does not apply to
FCC's termination of the defendant under those circumstances.
Fourth, the language of the release explicidy leaves open the question of
compensation for sales that were not completed before FCC's termination of the
defendant's employment, a number of which are listed in the defendant's Maryland
complaint.
Fifth, while the defendant was admittedly an at will employee of FCC, no one
may terminate an at will employee in violation of federal, state or local law. Under a
suit pending in Maryland Circuit Court, the defendant has sued FCC for
discrimination. If the defendant prevails, it will establish that FCC terminated the
defendant in bad faith. Furthermore the termination may not have been legally effective.
Either way, a ruling in the defendant's favor will establish that FCC had no legal right
to (a) induce the defendant to enter into a commission only employment agreement
providing for commissions to be cut off as of the date of the last day of work; (b)
urge the defendant to perform his job based on an expectation of continued
employment; and then (c) terminate the defendant illegally and in bad faith.
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Sixth, the release the plaintiff attaches to all its pleadings is short and to the
point. It refers to sales completed before termination on September 12, 1997. The plaintiffs
complaint addresses sales completed where the delivery of services had not been
completed before defendant's termination, sales for products for which the defendant
was not compensated and "future sales or for seminars held after the effective date of
his termination." (Plaintiffs Addendum 2). Since the release applies only to sales of
services before the effective date of the defendant's termination, it clearly is not
applicable in this case.
In order for the trial court to have granted the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment, the court must find that there was a contract of employment between the
parties and that the contract addressed the necessary issues. "|l]n evaluating a
contract, this court must first ascertain whether the contract was integrated and
second whether it was ambiguous." Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. v. Kur%etf etal, 876 P.2d
421 (Utah 1994) citing Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Bloomquist, 773 P.2d
1382,1385 (Utah 1989). In the Bailey case, the court found that the contract was
ambiguous in that it provided no guidance relevant to the proper remedy for breach.
(The same is true in the instant case.) The court, therefore, held that no enforceable
contract existed and recovery under quasi contract was appropriate. The contract
fails in the instant case fails on the same grounds as that in Bailey-Allen, thereby
allowing for recovery for unjust enrichment.
In addition, the issue exists as to whether or not there was ever a meeting of
the minds between FCC and Melvin. As noted in paragraph 29 of his supplemental
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declaration (Appellant's Brief, Attachment C, paragraph 29), the defendant assumed
when he signed the letter of employment that the commission term in the
Compensation letter did not apply if FCC were to unilaterally terminate him.
Therefore, there does not appear to have been a meeting of the minds on or about
April 9,1997, which would give rise to a binding contract.
In order to dispose of the case via summary judgment the trial court had to
determine:
1)

whether or not there was a meeting of the minds that created an
express contract evidenced by the letter of employment;

2)

whether or not the plaintiff acted in bad faith;

3)

whether the disputed sentence in the April, 1997 employment letter is
applicable to the relief the defendant requested;

4)

whether quantum meruit applies;

Rule 56 U.R.C.P. requires a trial court to specify in its order the finding the
facts that appear without substantial controversy. In its summary judgment Order the
trial court stated 'With respect to Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.s Motion
for Summary Judgment, there are no genuine issues of material fact and Plaintiff is
entided to judgment as a matter of law.6" The trial court failed to make the necessary

6

Yet plaintiff argues to this court that these meager findings were sufficient to
support the trial court's declaratory judgment Order which stated: 1) Franklin Covey
(which Franklin Covey is unclear) has no contractual, implied or other obligation to
pay the Defendant Melvin any compensation related to seminars held or future
seminars scheduled to be held or products sold subsequent to September 12,1997;
(2) the Release signed by Defendant Melvin on November 13,1997 bars all claims
related to payment of compensation or commissions; and (3) Franklin's policy and
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findings. "Summary judgement is appropriate only when there is no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law/' Crowther
v. Mover, 876 P. 2d 876, 878 (Utah App. 1994). "[A]U inferences must be resolved
against the moving party when a determination is made as to whether a factual dispute
exists". See Kline v. Signet Bank/Maryland, 651 A. 2d 422 (Md. App. 1995), citing Berkey
v. Delia, 413 A.2d 170 (1980). "On appeal from a summary judgment, we view the
facts and inferences fairly drawn from them in the light most favorable to the losing party."
Winegar v. Froerer Corp. 813 P.2d 104,107 (Utah 1991). "A summary judgment may be
granted only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Winegar at page 23; Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P.
Clearly each and every material fact alleged by the plaintiff to be undisputed
was, in fact, disputed by Mr. Melvin. In this case Melvin met his burden of presenting
some evidence, by affidavit, or otherwise, raising several credible issues of material
fact. See Dupler v. Yates 351 P.2d 624, 637 (Utah 1960). Yet the trial court chose to
ignore each and every one. "Without adequate findings of fact, there can be no
meaningful appellate review," Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App.
1993). The record created by the trial court fails to allow for adequate review. "To
allow the trial court to impose speculation on the adjudicatory process violates the
basic premise upon which our judicial system is founded. All parties are absolutely
entitled to a fair and impartial hearing and adjudication of their affairs," Willey v.
Willey, 914 P.2d 1149,1150 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The defendant submits that

practice with respect to the payment of commissions to separated Account
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throughout this process he has been denied both the substance and even the appearance
of a fair and impartial adjudication. The defendant further submits that in
extraordinary cases "when it is made to appear that the court has failed to correctly
apply principles of law or equity or that the judgment has so failed to do equity that it
manifests a clear abuse of discretion this court on review will take appropriate
corrective action in the interests of justice." Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149,1150 (Utah
App. 1996) citing Watson v. Watson, 561 P.2d 1072,1073-4 (Utah 1977). Defendant
submits that, at a minimum, the trial court abused its discretion in its finding of facts
requiring remand, and that, at this Court's discretion corrective action beyond remand
would be appropriate in the interests of justice since the trial court so completely
failed to apply principles of fairness, law and equity.
VI.

T H E TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION I N APPLYING
ITS FINDINGS TO MARYLAND LAW.
While the defendant did not raise this issue in his brief to this Court, the

plaintiff has felt it necessary to raise and argue this issue. It can be addressed (and
dismissed) summarily.
First, plaintiff contends that the trial court did not attempt to extend its ruling
to Maryland, (see footnote 2 declaratory judgment Order, "[TJhis Court finds that the
declaratory relief furnished herein is required under both Utah and Maryland law.")
and only included this statement in its ruling to avoid the necessity of engaging in a
conflict of laws analysis. There is no indication from the record that a conflict of
laws analysis was either considered or sought.

Executives is not violative of law.
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Second, the whole import of plaintiff s actions and the trial court's rulings was
to foreclose the defendant his day in court, any court, if possible. This action is
consistent both with those actions and intent.
Third, the ruling is irrelevant, even if the plaintiff were to try to have the trial
court's ruling upheld to prevent judicial action in Maryland. See Libert)/ Mutual
Insurance Co. v. RotchesPork Packers, Inc., 969 R2d 1384.88 (2nd Cir. 1992) in which the
Second Circuit recognized that a court may take judicial notice of a document filed in
another court 'not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other Htigation, but
rather to establish the fact of such htigation and related filings." Accordingly, a court
may take judicial notice of another court's order only for the limited purpose of
recognizing the "judicial act" that the order represents or the subject matter of the
htigation. See also, United States v. Garland, 991 F.2d 328, 322 (6th Cir. 1993); Colonial
Leasing Co. v. Logistics Control Group Int% 762 R2d 454,459 (5th Cir. 1985); FDIC.
OTlahaven, 857 R Supp. 154,157-58 (D.N.H. 1994). Thus, plaintiffs attempt to end
run the Maryland Courts through his misuse of the Utah Courts is unavailing.
Article 7, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, states that "[N]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.: The overreaching,
abuse and misuse of the Court of Utah in this case by the plaintiff in its efforts to
deny the defendant even the appearance of due process cries out for redress.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing and for all of the reasons stated above,
it is respectfully requested:
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1.

That this Court enter an Order dismissing the instant action for lack of
jurisdiction or in the alternative remand this matter to the trial court
with instruction to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal in favor
of the defendant

2.

That this Court enter an Order dismissing the instant action on
whatever grounds it deems appropriate or in the alternative remand
this matter to the trial court with instruction to enter the appropriate
judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant.

3.

Further, that this Court enter an Order awarding costs and attorney's
fees to the defendant or in the alternative remand this matter to the
trial court with instructions to enter the appropriate judgment for costs
and attorney's fees.

Respectfully submitted,

Marsha A. Ostrer. Esq.
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ADDENDUM

ATTACHMENT A

David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
(301) 593-3364 FAX (301) 593-2987
Defendant, ^w se

I N T H E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
I N A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 980901616MI
Judge David S. Young

v.
David Melvin,
Defendant.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT OR ORDER
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, theprv se Defendant
respectfully submits this reply memorandum in support of his Motion for Relief from
Judgment or Order pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) of the U.R.C.P., and in response to plaintiffs
memorandum states as follows:
1. While the plaintiff attempted to collapse both Rule 60 motions filed by the defendant
into one response, the defendant will treat them separately and requests separate rulings
as they relate to very different issues with different results.
2. After trotting out all of the same tired arguments, the essence of plaintiffs response to
the defendant's Rule 60(b)(1) motion is that he now claims that the filing was not an
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actual assignment but rather a pleading alleging the assignment. In any event it still fails
because:
a. The "pleading" fails to conform with the requirements of Rule 17 which requires
that the case be pursued by the "real party in interest," and makes no provision
for such assignments.
b. Section 78-33-2 and 4 likewise require standing to sue and make no provision for
the "assignment" of those rights to a non party.
c. In fact, as usual, plaintiff has taken a highly novel position to protect an act that
is not authorized by statute or case law and, of course, asserts none for this
court to rely upon if it were to rule in plaintiffs favor. It is ludicrous to assert
that the Consent to be Bound document is "evidence of an assignment" that
had previously been made when there is no legal basis for the assignment to be
made at all. The plaintiff engages in this sophistrific bootstrapping to no
purpose. A party either has standing or it doesn't. Absent specific statuatory
authorization, it can't be assigned and no such authorization exists. Estate of
Martin Haw v. Harv, 254 UAR 19, 20 (Utah App. 1994). The plaintiff is not "a
party authorized by statute" to sue in another's name without "joining the party
for whose benefit the action is brought" Rule 17(a) nor does it fall within any of
the other Rule 17(a) exceptions. Therefore, whether the Consent to be bound is
the assignment itself or merely evidence of the assignment doesn't matter since
no authorization exists.
3. This court has never ruled upon the defendant's contention that the evidentiary value of
the so called "Consent to be Bound" was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice as raised in the defendant's original motion. O'Banion v. Owens-Corning
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Fiberglass Corp., 968 F.2d 1011 (10th Cir. 1992) and cases cited therein. Should the court
find this to be true, then the plaintiffs whole case falls apart. Certainly, since this issue
has not previously been raised it is appropriate to bring it to the trial court's attention
prior then raising it on appeal. "Rule 60(b)(1) provides a trial court may relieve a party of
a judgment in a case o f . . . mistake of law by the trial court." Bischelv. Merritt, 278 UAR
29, 30 (Utah C t App. 1995).
The Motion also raises the issue that the findings of fact are insufficient to support the
conclusions of law. "It has long been the law in this state that conclusions of law must
be predicated upon and find support in the findings of fact." GMmor v. Wright, 209 UAR
6, 9 (Utah 1993) citing cases back to 1917. Without the actual documents, this argument
could not be presented to this court. Again, it is appropriate and a proper use of judicial
resources to bring this to the attention of the trial court, before raising the issue on
appeal. SeeBischeL
The plaintiffs contention that Maryland case law has been briefed and presented to this
court is just false. Either that or plaintiff neglected to serve that pleading on the
defendant. Rather this court, "mechanically adopted findings of fact and conclusions of
law prepared and submitted" by plaintiff "without modifying them or changing them in
any respect." A process frowned on by the appellate courts. Atlantic Control Products
Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc. 780 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1989). And, the plaintiff responded to
this opportunity by trying to immunize itself in every way it possibly could.
Finally the plaintiff argues that the defendant's Rule 60(b)(1) motion is an attempt to
gain a second round in the trial court before filing its appeal. To the contrary, the
defendant is merely trying to obtain an adequate record to appeal from. "Without
adequate findings of fact, there can be no meaningful appellate review," Willey v. Willey,
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866 P.2d 547, 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Willy v. Willy, 914 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996); Willy v. Willy, 333 UAR 8,10 (Utah, 1997) and an appellate court is
forced to remand an action to the trial court (on occasion, several times) in order to
obtain adequate findings to review. This is wasteful of judicial resources and places an
unfair burden on the party forced to continually apply to the appellate courts for relief.
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